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Introduction 
In its resolution of the  21st  November 1994 on reinforcing European competitiveness, the  Council 
. invited the Commission to repoit regularly on the competitiveness of  European industry  .. 
This Communication summarises the main findings of the 1999 Competitiveness Report t and aims to 
stimula!e  the debate on  the  adaptation of ~uropean industry .  to  the new conditions resulting  from 
increasing competition both within and outside the European Union.  ·  . 
The  1999 Competitiveness Report is  the third one issued after the Council resolution .. It deals with 
structural change in the EU economy, focusing. on the. presentation .and  analysis of sectoral data on 
manufacturin~.  ~. 
The. choice  of emphasis  on  manufa<;:turing  and· the  use  of country-level,  rather  than  regional, 
information are imposed by data availability. 
Adaptability: key to competitiveness 
. The competitiveness of  a ~ountry is essential for the welfare of  its citizens. It means output· growth and 
:high rates of emploYment in a  sustainable e~vironrnent. In 'a fast-moving world economy, one of the 
. keys to  ~ompetitiveness is adaptability. An economy is adaptable if it can accumulate· and re-deploy 
resources rapidly in pursuit of new opportunities, while, at the same time, ftilly  exploiting existing 
-competitive strengths. AdaptaQility ,is crucial not only for the growth prospects of a country bu(  also 
·.  for its resilience to economic shocks.  · 
For an economy t~ be adaptable to rapid changes of  tt;chnology and tastes,  it should combine macro-
. 'stability with micro-mobility. This year's Competitiveness Report is about mobility, structural change 
and accumulation in the European manufacturing sector over the last ten years. 
The  1999 Competitiveness report  is  divided in three parts.  The first part considers the speed  and 
pattern  or' charige  'in  the  s~ctur.e of European ·manufacturing.  It looks  at  trends  in  i~dustrial 
specialisation and in geographic concentration and it relates structural change to  growth patterns in 
7:  Europe  . 
.  The second part considers in -more detail some of the prime forces behind structural change.  These 
(  . ·  ·-inc I  ude the qecisions of  firms to invest in tangible and intangible assets and the reorganisation of  large  -
f .  .  ... :.··multinational  enterprises  (MNEs): into  integrated  European.., wide  organisations  operating  through 
t ·  networks. 
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~·The third part provides  SQme  indications on the  sensitivity of different  Industries and of  differ~nt 
European countries to a world-wide economic shock. It looks, in particular, at the effects ~n European 
competitiveness of  the recent crisis in Southeast Asia  . 
I  European Commission ( 1999). The competitiveness of European industry:  1999 Report. Luxembourg, SEC (99) 1555. · · ' 
Large potential gains froin restr~_cturing 
·. During the period 1988-1998, manufacturing value added in constant prices grew 'in the ·EU hy 1.8% 
p.a. and employment in manufacturing fell by 1.4% p.a. on average. Co~pared  to the eighties, this has 
been a period of  slow growth for both. Europe and Japan. Growth has accelerated, instead, in the USA 
(see Figure 1). 
Figure' 1: Growth of manufacturing production and productivity in the Triad (1988=1 00) 
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Source: WIFO (Osterreichisches In;titutftJr Wirtschaftsforschung) calculations using Main Economic Indicators (OECD) and SBS tEurostat). 
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Output  and .  employment  performance  were  weak  despite  the  fact  that  European  manufacturing 
maintained its market share in the world markets and enjoyed a quality premium in its exports. The 
trade surplus remained large over most of  the periop (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Trade surplus and quality premium in EU trade_ 
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Source: WIFO calculations using COM EXT  (Eurostat). 
Slow output growth was accompanied with sharp falls in employment in most large EU countries as 
well ,as  in  Finland and in Sweden. Only Ireland and  Denmark registered substantial growth in both 
.  output and employment in the manufacturing sector (see Table 1). 
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Table 1: Annual growth, byMember State 
1998/1988  1997/1988 
Value. added  Value added  Productivity  Employment 
EU  2.9  3.2- 4.3  -1.1 
Ireland  7.9  ·9.9.  5.7  4.2 
Austria  6.7  7.0  8.8  -1.8 
Portugal  6.7'  7.2.  7.6  ~o.4 
Belgium  4.7  .5.3  n.a.  · n.a. 
Greece  4.4  5.6  '7.3  -1.7 
Netherlands  3.9  4.2  4.2  0.0 
Denmark  3.9  4.2  2.~  1.7 
Spain  3.6  3~  1  .3.9  .  -0.8
1 
Germany  3.0  3.2  5.~  -2.0 
France  2.4  2.8  3.7  -0.9 
Italy  2.5·.  2.7  .  3.3  -0.6 
United Kingdom  2.3  2.4  4.4  -2.0 
·Finland  1.8  1.5 
' 
1.9  -0.4 
Sweden  -0.2  0.3  0.9  -0.6 
Notes: Value added in nominal terms. 
Source: WIFO calculations using SBS (Eurostat). 
in part, the poor performance in the last decade ·may be due to cyClical factors. The case of Finland is 
different in that this. country  s~ffer~d a devastating loss of export  ~arkets in the beginning of the~ 
nineties  but  seems  to  have,  sinc'e,  turned  around  the tide.  For the  most  part,- however,  previous 
··  ·:  . '_competitiveness  reports  have  attribu.ted  the  unsatisfactory  outcome  of the  nineties  to  structural 
weaknesses that' have prevented EU firins from taking full advantage of  new market opportunities. In 
·general, small, open economies appear to have performed better.  ·  .  -
. Growth  in  output· and  empl9yment  also  varied  between  different  sectors  of the  economy.  Those 
· typified  by  hlige  investments  in  intangibJes,· such  as  advertising and  research  intensive  industries, . 
grew faster than average. They also shed relatively fewer jobs. Capital and laboi.rr intensive industries 
h~ve done. worse on both accounts.  ·  ·  · 
·The overall industrial specialisation of EU manufacturing does -not appear,· however, to  be the main 
factor explaining slow growth: The variation in growth across countries. is more pronounced than that 
across industries. This suggests that it is the genera/ environment of  doing business in  each  cow1try 
that needs to be the focus of  policy.  ·  ·. ·  ·  . 
Further,  the  fact. that  growth rates  vary  substantially .for  the  same  industry  in  different  countries 
suggests that there may still. be muc!z  scope for restructuring and reallocation of  resources  within 
·Europe.  . 
·Little change in Member States' degree o~  specialisation2 
High  specialisation  in  few  industrial  sectors can be a blessing or a  curse  for  a· single. country.  For 
smaller countries, in particular, it allows a better exploitation of scale. economies and of externalities 
of know-how. The effects, however, of an adverse economic shock may be· devastating for a  highly 
specialised country,_ especially if  the mobility and adaptability in the economic system is low. 
2  The  production  structure of a country is ''highly specialised" if a. small' number of industries accounts  fo~ a  large· share .of its. 
production.  This will  be called "production specialisation".  Specialisation can  also  be  measured  for  exports, or for  exports  and 
imports together·- "export specialisation":and "trade specialisation" respectively. Needle&s to say, patterns of specialisation (as well 
as those of  concentration, discussed below) do not necessarily follow the lines of  any  standard industrial classification scheme, such  -
a's  NACE used here.  Sp~cialisation processes sometimes develop at more disaggregated levels- sub-industries or even firms and 
they may ,be  r~gions within countries.  · 
3 Over  the  period  under  consideration,  on  average  Member  States'  degree  of specialisation  in 
production has risen  only  marginally.  The  rise  is  for  the  most  part  attributable  to  ·increasing 
specialisation of  larger countries in some industries, for example, cars in Germany, machinery in Italy 
and  food  in  the  United  Kingdom.  Smaller  co~tries did  sU:_ccessfully  exploit  niches  but  did  not 
experience, in general, a rising specialisation in prod~ction. 
Further,  there  are  indications that the degree of  specialisation in  exports' has tended  t~ fall,  albeit 
slowly. The tendency of de-sp-ecialisation in exports is more prominent among smaller EU  Member 
States, with- the notable exception of Ireland.  De-specialisation in  exports ·should have reduced  the 
. exposure of  smaller countries to external industry-specific demand shocks (see Figure 3  ). 
Figure 3: Production and trade specialisation: 1988 to 1998 (share of the largest five sectors) 
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There ·is  no  conclusive  explanation  of the  opposite  trends  be~een  .production  specialisation  and 
export specialisation. One possible cause would be that MNE headquarter services are more likely to _ 
be included in value added statistics rather than .in export statistics. Changes in the mix of intra- and 
· inter-industry trade could also explain this phenomenen. 
Geographical concentrationJ of industries. declined 
High geographical concentration of  production or of  exports means that a few countries supply a large 
part of  the quantity so.ld in a given market.  · 
Previous analyses have shown that the EU economy as  a ·whole is less geographically concentrated 
than that of the  USA.  This has often led to  the prediction that an  integrated Europe could become 
more concentrated. Peripheral and small countries could suffer irt the process. 
3  Geographical concentration is defined as the extent to which EU activity in a given industry is concentrated in just a few  Member 
States. It should be stressed that the report uses aggregate data, not firm data. The term "concentration" is therefore used to indicate 
the distribution of an  industry across the Member States and should not be confused with the notion of "seller concentration" used 
in  industrial economics and in competition policy, which denotes the importance of  the largest firms in a market. 
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·Contrary to such predictions, geographical concentration of  both production and exports fell in Europe 
during the nineties for the great majority of  industiies  .. This was primarily due to the fact that smaller 
EU Member States have grown faster on average than larger ones. A number of industries expanded. 
their basis.beyo~d the bor<}ers of  the more industrially developedEU countries.  · 
f  .  . 
.  Ori  average,  the share of the three largest countries in total EU value added fell  by more than one 
percentage point. In exports, the fall was closer to four percentage points. Moreover, the geographical 
concentration of research and skill intensive industries declined  f~ter than on average. The smaller 
EU countries gained shares also in these industries.  . 
, Thus, contr~  .  .to. e:x;pressed fears, closer integration in Europe ·does not seem to have led to  ::t  "core-
.t>eriphery" model at Member State level (see Figure 4r  · 
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Figure 4: Geographic concentration of  production and exports 
Co~e  versus periphery coun.trles ,  o19M8 
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··  Belgium (with Luxembourg), Denmark, .Germany and Austria;·~'middle-income  ... countries are France, Italy; the Netherlands,. Finland, Sweden  a~d the 
··!  .  United Kingdom; "low-income" countries are Greece, Spain, lreland;and Portugal.  . 
Source: WIFO calculations using SBS (Eurostat). 
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.  ·, ·Speed: of change  _is important for growth 
Structural  change is not  an  end-in itself.  It is  of interest  to  policy makers  in so  far  as  it reveals 
something about the adaptability and, hence, the competitiveness of  the European economic system .. 
·  · The evidence from  industry Jor the last ten years suggests thaf there is  a reiationship between  the 
· "mobility" or "speed of  structural change" ln Member States and the growth pf  their production and 
exports (see Fig~e  5).  ·  ·  .. 
Figure 5: Speed of  structural change and growth of production and exports 
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Note: The "speed of  structural change" index measures the net efTcct of  structural tiimsformation over a ten-year period: It is computed ti.1r each 
country and separately for value adde_d and exports (total, i.e. extra- and intra-EU) by summing the absolute changes in the sector (i.e: two-digit 
industry) shares between 1988 and 1998. This index'is zero when no industry changes its share and it increases the more industries change their  · 
relative positiQns. This information does not have the same· scale as the  growth in  value added  an<~ exports reported· on the  left-hand side of 
each figure.  .  ·  . 
Source: WIFO calculations using SBS and COM  EXT (Euro~tat). 
Looking  at  the  EU as  a  whole,  mobility  is found  to  have  increased since  the  early  nineties,  as· 
economic integration acce_lerated  in line with the Single Market ProgrC!Jllllle.  It declined somewhat 
overthe recession years of  1993-94 (see Figure 6).  · 
·  Ori  balance,. the .ev'idence of the  first  part  of  the report  suggests  th~t, over the  last  ten  years.  the 
industrial structure of  Europe has been changing, albeit relatively slowly. This change has been in line 
. with· the objectives of cohesion  in  Europe:  it  has  not  created  unfa,vounible  asymmetries  between· 
countries and it has tended to favour smaller countries in the perip~ery of  the EU. 
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I 00), 1989 is the difference bet~een 1989 and 1986, etc..  · 
Source:  WIFO calculations using SBS (Eurostat). 
· · Structural change in a period of  decelerating investment 
The. observed industrial ,change _becomes .all the more importarit if  one considers that It took place in 'a .. 
. decade of  weak inves~ent  activity in Europe.  ·  ·  - ·  '  · · 
· lri the nineties,  the annual  growth rate. of investment fell  sharply to  0.8% p.a.  (from  2:5%  in the . 
.  eighti~$). As a per~entage  of(}DP, gross investment in the EU was c/ose.to its post.:. war mfni,;,um· (see·· 
Figure  7).  The  deceleration  was onli partly due  to  the overall  fall  in  government  investinept .in 
.  ·. •  Europe.·. Growth  of investment in  the  private  sector ·also fell  sharply.  The· deceleration  concerned 
· · ma1nly, but not exclusively, the- manufacturing sector. 
'In contrast,'.recoverj. and  restructuring  in  the  USA  were accompanied  ~y a  strong  acceleration-in 
... investment growth (to 5.4% from 2.4% in the eighties). The acceleration was mainly due to  private·· 
investment in the manufacturing sector.  · 
.  .  '  .  : .  .  .  .  . 
Within'  the  EU,  France,  Italy,  Finland  and  Sweden experienced  a  fall  in  gross  investment in- the  · · · 
nineties. Investment activity in Germany and  Belgi~ grew at or below tl}e EU average._ The highest. 
rates of  growth were re~orded in Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal. 
•  ~  • 1  • 
.  /  .  .  .  ~  .  .  . .  .  .  .  .  . .. 
bivestment growth and employment creation have been-pfJsitively related in the long run (see :rable 2). 
This relation seems to have become stronger over time.  . 
Low invesiment is likely to have slowed down· structural change, particularly in the recession years of . 
1993·-i994  .. With the e~cepti~n of  Spain, the "speed of  adjustment" of  the. manufactwi_ng sector' in all. - .·.: 
large  European countries (and in Japan) was lower than  in  the USA.  This was  in  contrast to  the . 
,eighties when Germany and Japari·had the fastest "speed ofadjustment"among all large indu~irialised 
countries. 
7 Figure 7: Gross,fixed capitalformation at 1990·prices: total economy (percentage ofGDP) 
~EU15  -usA  -+-Japan 
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Source: European Commission. 
Table 2: Trends in GDP, investment and employment (average annual rate of  change) 
UUP 
1970-80 1980-90 1990-98 
ltlelgturn  J.4 
Denmark  2.2 
Germany  2.7 
Greece  4.6 
Spain  3.5 
France  3.3 
Ireland  4.7 
Italy  3.6 
Luxembourg  2.6 
Netherlands  '3.0 
Austria·  3.6 
Portugal  4;7 
Finland  3.4 
Sweden  2.0 
United Kingdom  1.9 
EU-11  3.2 
EU-15  2.9 
I  USA  3;2 
Japan.  4.5 
Note: EUII =  Euro zone. 
Sourre: European Commission. 
l.!l  I:l 
2.0  2.7 
2.2  2.0 
0.7  1.9 
3.0  2.1 
2.4  1.6 
3.6  7.7 
2.2  1.2 
4.5  5.0 
2.2  2.6 
2.3  2.1 
3.2  2.4 
3.1  L5 
2.0  1.0 
2:7  2.0 
2.4  '  1.8 
2.4  1.8 
2.9  2.7 
4.0  1.1 
Ul'C.l'  .t:mployment 
1970-80 1980-90 1990-98 1970-80 1980-90 1990-9S  · 
2.:5  2.3  0.9  0.2  0.2  0.2 
-0.8  1.6  4.4  '  0.7  0.7  0.3 
1.2  1.6  0.9  0.1  0.6  -0.5 
2.8  -0.4  3.3  0.7  1.0  0.5 
1.6  5.2  1.4  -0.6  0.9  0.6 
2.5  2.3  -0.3  0.5  0.3  0.2 
5.7  0.5  5.6  0.9  -0.2  2.9 
1.7  1.6  -0.4  0.6  0.4  -0.6 
2.6  3.7  5.9  1.2  1.7  3.0 
0.2  1.9  2.6  0.7  1.1  1.7 
'3.7  2.5  3.1  Q.3'  1.1  1.1 
4.1  3.0  4.4  0.4  1.2  0.4 
2.1  3.4  -2.5  0.9  -
0.6~  ~1.3 
0.6  3.3  -2.2  0.9  0.5  -1.4 
0.5  4.3  2.0  0.3  0.8  0.0 
1.7  2.2  0.6  0.3  0.6  0.0 
1.5  2.5  0.8  0.3  '  0.6  0.0 
'3.6  2.4·  5.4  2.4  1.8  1.3 
3.5  5.2  -0.4  0.8  1.2  0.5 
The business environment of  individual Member States has an 
important influence_ on htvestment 
There is  no  single  set of factors  that  can  explain  investment· patterns  in  European  manufacturing 
during 1985-1995 ..  Both macro-economic factors and the life cycle of  products and industries seem to 
have played an important role. 
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Investment rates "in European industries varied just as much across industries (in the same country) as 
. they varied  across  countries  (for the  same  indu~try). Thus,  macro7"economic  policies  and national· 
regulatory frameworks may have been as  important as  industry-specific technological changes'  and 
chang~s in consumer preferences.  -
·Two poi~ts are nevertheless worth· noting in this respect. First, there is little evi4enc~- of a Europ~an­
wide investment cycle. Variables, such as domestic demand and labour .costs, continue to be important 
determinants of investment at the national level.  Thus, despite the process of-economic integration, 
. there is,still a significant '~home-country effect" influencing investment. 
, Second, this "home country effect" does not seem to be exclusively due_to differences in the business 
, · cycle of  Member States. Differences in investment rates of  Member States have persisted over a long · 
period,  tlll-~:mgho~t the  business, cycle  and  across  sectors  .. This  suggests  that  there,  are  important 
differences  in  the structural characteristics,  as  well as  in  cultural and institutional background of 
·Member States, affecting the investment decisions of  firms.  · 
··.·Member States' heterogeneity persis.ts also· in intangible investment 
Member State's characteristics seem to matter  also for the decisions of firms  to  invest in intangible 
·.and in huinan capital.  .  · 
.  .  .  .  .  .  . 
.. · Despite the importance of these types of capital for the competitiveness of  the economy, our relevant· 
· data sources and our understanding of  the investment decisio'ns in this field are inadequate. 
Based 'on a broad industry taxonomy by factor inputs, one can gain a  glimpse· of  the heterogeneity that 
exists in EU (see Table 3).'  · 
Table 3: Value added shares in total manufacturhig in 1997;% 
-
Mainstream  Labour- ·Capital- ·  Marketing- Technology- .. 
manufacturing  intensive·  intensive  driven  driven 
Belgium  22.12  15.63  22.24  21.08  18.93 
Denmark  29.50  14.68  12.08  28.60  15.13 
Germany  .  28.06  14.13  15.46  16.22  26.13 
Greece  19.61  17.71  19.26  35.36 ..  8.06 
Spain  .  2L17  20.78  16.47  26.73  14.84 
France  . 21.94  13.57.  14.69  22.10  27.69 
Ireland  12.06  6.25  .12.56  31.48  37.66 
Italy  28.88  19.84  15.90  17.65  17.73 
Netherlands  21.50  11.75  19.23  31.20  16.32 
Austria  26.39  18.83  16.29  24.61  13.88 
Portugal  21.92'  23.65,  13.94  29.77  10.72 
Finland  22.82  '  14.98  28.59  17.54  16.07 
Sweden  21.95  12.07  21.25  16.i6  28.57 
. United Kingdom  22.85  .  13.21  14.33  25.52  24.08 
EU  25.41  15.31  15.55  21.28  22.4§ 
USA  21.26  12.22  13.51  23.17  29.84  . 
Japan  24•.86  16.00  16.01  21.00  22.13 
Sui/ret•: WIFO calculations based on SBS (E_urostat).  · 
- Different stmctural patterns reflect differences in the utilisationoftectinology and in the skill intensity 
of  p'roduction methods, both of  which affect labour productivity and export unit values:  . 
The  em-pirical  evidence  suggests  that  investment  in  intangibles  is  imporialu for.  competitiveness 
. ·  irrE;spective  of the  industrial  specialisation  of the  country.  It  is  particularly  relevant  for  the 
competitiveness of  high-R&D and  high.,.~kill intensive industries.· 
9 Labour productivity, in particular, is  found to be determined,  in order of importance, by the s!Qll-
intensity  of labour,  by the  invested  physical  capital,  by  the  research  expenditures  and  by  the 
advertising outlays. 
Multinati~nals are reorganising into European-wide networks 
Industry level data reflect only part of  the whole restructuring process and mobility in Europe. A large 
part of  this process takes place within industries, at the micro level. It involves, among other things, 
the entry and  exit of firms,  changes in ownership  and  control  of enterprises through  mergers  and 
acquisitions, as well as the internal reorganisation oflarge MNEs. 
The strategies  and  structure of MNEs have  changed  over time.  The  establishment of stand-alone 
affiliates based on a specific territory, operating autonomously and duplicating activities represent old 
strategies.  At  present,  an  increasing  number. of MNEs  are  becoming  integrated  Europe-'!Vide 
· organisations. They build, and operate through, production and subcontracting networks that span the 
wh()le of  Europe (see Table 4).  · 
.  Table 4: Evolution ofthe strategies an·d structures of MNEs 
Form  Types of  intra- Degree of  Environment 
fimi linkages  integration 
- Host country accessible 
Ownership,  to FDI; significant trade 
Stand-alone 
technology 
Weak  baniers; costly 
communications and 
transportation 
Ownership, 
Simple  technology,  Partially  Bilaterally open trade 
integration  markets, 
strong  and FDI; non-equity 
finance, other  arrangements 
inputs 
Complex  Potentially  Open trade and FDI; IT; 
international  All functions  strong  convergence in tastes; 
production  overall  increased competition 
Source: World Investment Report 1993 (Umted Nations). 
The  progress in  information  and communication technologies  (ICT)  has  made  access  to  networks 
easier for all firms. Nevertheless, it remains true that larger firms have more possibilities to brJi/d and 
participate in such networks throughout Europe. 
· The creation of  these integrated enterprise networks has far.,reaching effects on European restructuring 
.  and integration. 
First, the networking of  firms is essential for the cross-border transfer of  know-how and of  proprietary 
advantages.  Second,  firms  that  belong  to  such  a  network  have  an  increased  ability  to  reallocate 
resources  internally in  response to  adverse economic shocks.  This  increases the adaptability of the 
whole economic system. At the same time, it limits the margins within which purely domestic policies 
can be conducted.  · 
Summarising, the second part of this report argues that the weak investment activity of the nineties 
has, in all probability, made restructuring 'in .EU more difficult. Investment decisions in both tangible 
and  intangible  assets  are  still  influenced  ·'significantly  by  country  specific  s·tructures  and 
characteristics. It is easier for larger MNEs to reorganise their operation to take full  advantage of the 
10 
• Single. Market Policy needs  to  focus,  therefore,  on local  impediments  to  investment  and  .on  the 
difficulties of  SMEs to build and participate in European-wide networks.  / 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Industrial structure is important hn facing world-wide ·shocks 
'-· 
'·  · Adaptability  is  essential for  the  resilience ,of the  European  economic  system  tQ  shocks.  The 
redeployment  of resources  can  mitigate  the  effeCts  of adverse  economic  conditions  in  a  specific 
industry oPcountry. -
,. 
' 
~' 
'  .. 
The  recent -crisis  in  Southeast  Asia  is  a  good  example  of how  a  macro  shock  abroad  may  . 
asymmetrically liit industries and countries within Europe, necessitating a rapid structural adjustment. 
.  The aggregate impact ofthe crisis on European manufacturing during 1996-1998 is estimated to have· 
· . been between  half and  one percent· of aggregate  production. As the  impact  was  not  concentrated 
particularly in sectms of high labour intensity, the loss of employment in manufacturing is  likely to 
. have been of the  same  order.  In  the  longer run,  the  effects  of the  crisis  could  still  prove  more 
signi/icant. 
The overall analysis indicates that the effect ofthe crisis on EU manufacturingproduction was rather 
. asymmetric  across  industries.  Luxury  goods  industries  stand  .out  as  having  been  hit  hardest: 
Engineering industries also· appear to have been highly exposed to the crisis. Basic metals industries . 
have both lost exports and faced tougher import competition at home. 
:::·  . ·  EU  countries were also hit asymmetrically, depending on thf!ir industrial specialisation (see Table 5). 
'  - .·  .  . 
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Table 5: EU manuf~cturing trade l'fitb Squtbeast Asia 
(actual and adjusted chang~  in exporys and imports) a 
Exports  Imports 
/  %change 1996~  1998  %change 1996-1998 
•  ? 
Actual 
Adjusted 
Actual  Adjusted b  b 
France  3.5  -1.5  37.9  33.8 
Belgium-Luxembourg  -13.5  -20.1  .  . 33.6  28.1 
Netherlands  -19.8  -14.7  55.1  37.7 
·  Germany  -20.1  -19.8  14.~ 
' 
33.6 
Italy  -38.8  -26:8  .  43.9  36.0 
United. Kingdom  -0:3  -14.4  37.0  34.1 
Ireland  21.7  . 3.8  75.4  43.3 
Denmark  .  -7.4  -16.9  36.7  32.1 
Greece  -26.7  '-24.9  15.6  56.3 
Portugal  -26.5  -6.0  16.0  27.3 
Spain  ·  -40.2  -20.4  . 59.6  37.4· 
Sweden  -23.5  -15.6  I  11.8  28.8 
Finland  -27.7  -15.6  19.0  29.3 
Austria  -22.1  .  -19.7  9.8  32.1  .. 
•  Calculated on trade values. 
b  Using actual sector shares in total.extra-EU imports and exports in  1996 for each 
Member State but assuming average EU growth rates.  . 
Source: NEI (Ncdcrlands Economisch lnstituut) using COM EXT (Eui'ostat)  . 
;. 
Export ·specialisation ·  ~as an  important  contributing  factor  to  aggregated  falls  in  the  value  of 
manufacturing  exports  to. Southeast  Asia. for  German'y,  Iti:lly,  Spain,  Sweden,  Austria,  Belgium-
Luxembourg and Portugal. 
11  .  ---I 
-It  is  less evident whether Member States' import specialisation prior to the crisis had an  important 
effect on the growth.rate of  imports from Southeast Asia. In Italy and Spain, an even stronger negative 
.  ·effect came through a poor performance of  individual industries relative to the EU as a whole.· 
- -
In conclusion 
Adaptability  and  rapid  structural  change  ~e essential  for  the  competitiveness  of the  European 
··economy and its resilience to world-wide economic fluctUations.  The 1999 Competitiveness Report 
argues that: 
•  ·  In  a  period  of. low  growth  and  low  investmef,lt  ·rates,  the  European  manufacturing  system 
nevertheless appears to have taken advantage.of European integration, shifting resources between 
industries and countries. 
•  This restructuring seems to ·have taken place in line with the broad objective of closer cohesion. 
Data at Member State level does not indicate any strengthening of a "core-periphery" model. On 
the contrary, smaller countries in the periphery of  the EU have tended to benefit most. 
•  A reco~ery in invest~ent activity in both tangible and intangible assets will_ be needed to facilitate : 
the desired structural changes.  ·  · 
•  Along  with  industry-specific  factors,  there  is  still  a  large  "home:-country  effect"  influencing 
investment in both tangible and intangible assets.  Emphasis on these local  conditions and iocal 
impediments is essential for building a favourable environment for higher investment in Europe. 
•  Cross border· networking of enterprises  is  also  essential  for  restructuring and. competitiveness. 
Large  MNEs  are  already  reorganising  their  internal  operations  to  take  advantage  of positive 
network effects in the Single Market. Attention is needed on the networking of  smaller firms. 
The main challenge for policy makers that stems from  the  above conclusions is  how to  release the 
potential.for further adjustment of  industrial structures.  .  - . 
Future analysis should seek to identify those factors which play a key role in the adjustment process 
·.and the best'avenues for influencing them. The implementation of  the Economic and Monetary Union, 
the emergence of electronic comlllerce and, more generally, the information society are examples of 
recent developments which encourage structural adjustment. The country-specific structural factors, 
the  importance  of which  was  emphasised  in  the  1999  Competitiveness  Report,  can  constitute  a 
suitable ar~a for the application of  benchmarking techniques. 
· ·Beyond enterprise· policy, the Commission will continue to  exploit the results of its competitiveness 
analysis within the wider framework of the Cardiff process, the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 
an~ the European Employment Strategy, particularly in re_lation to structural reform issues. 
Limited availability ofstatistical information, in particular as concerns services, reduced the scope of 
, the analysis.  There is a need to look further into the possibilities of  improving the statistical tools for 
· the purposes of  competitiveness analysis. 
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